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1 Introduction
The Great Recession in 2008 and its devastating impact on youth unemployment spurred the
debate on the long-term effects of economic downturns on the career prospects of young gradu-
ates. In the current public debate the dominant viewpoint is that the Great Recession creates a
lost generation. But is this view evidence based? Economic research has only relatively recently
started investigating this question, exploring data on past recessions in various countries. For
instance, Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos et al. (2012), and very recently Altonji et al. (2014) show
that in North-America adverse initial conditions push college graduates into initial lower-quality
placements and that this translates into long-term penalties on earnings or wages. In Europe,
e.g. Raaum and Røed (2006) in Norway, Kwon et al. (2010) in Sweden, and Brunner and Kuhn
(2014) in Austria reach similar conclusions. More generally, existing evidence broadly confirms
the conjecture that a recession1 has persistent impact on labor market outcomes of young grad-
uates, although the magnitude and persistence of these effects depend much on the considered
outcome (employment, wage, earnings,...), the level of educational attainment, and the institu-
tional environment (see Section 2). This study analyses various of these dimensions in a unique
employer-employee dataset that matches survey and administrative data on a sample of male
school graduates in Flanders, the most prosperous of three regions in Belgium.
The case of Belgium is particularly interesting, because labor market rigidity, as measured
by flows in and out of unemployment, is among the highest in OECD. For instance, the average
monthly job destruction rate between 1990 and 1999 was less than 0.5% of the labor force, while
expected unemployment duration exceeded 20 months. These figures are comparable to the
Italian, but contrast with those of the much more flexible US labor market, where 1.25% jobs
were destroyed every month and the mean unemployment duration was as low as five months
(Pe´rez and Yao, 2015). The research of Genda et al. (2010), and more recently, of Kawaguchi and
Murao (2014) suggests that the effects of graduating during a recession are much more persistent
in a rigid labor market than in a flexible one. Our study provides further valuable evidence on
this hypothesis. Moreover, since in Belgium the sources of this rigidity differ according to skill
level, we can obtain some insights in how distinct sources of rigidity drive different hysteresis
mechanisms. For high skilled workers the rigidity is predominantly induced by the very strict
employment protection legislation (EPL) for white collar workers. But this does not apply for
low skilled workers, since they are usually employed as blue collar workers for whom, until very
recently, EPL was very loose. For low skilled youth, (sectoral) minimum wages that are among
the highest of OECD, and lenient short-time work compensation (STC) and unemployment
insurance (UI) systems are therefore more relevant sources of rigidity.
In line with the institutional setting, we find that adverse labor market conditions hardly
1In line with the aforementioned literature, a “recession” refers to a situation of adverse labor market conditions
as measured by a rise in the unemployment rate rather than to a decline of real GDP.
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affect hourly wages of low educated youth and that nearly all the burden of the adjustment runs
through the annual number of hours worked, predominantly induced by more unemployment
experience. The negative impact matters more in the first years after graduation, but it persists
up to 12 years later. This is in line with the ample evidence that experiencing unemployment
(early in the career) inflicts long-term scars on labor market outcomes (e.g.,Arulampalam, 2001;
Gregg, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005; Schmillen and Umkehrer, 2013).
For high educated youth, minimum wages are in general not binding, STC is not available,
and replacement rates in UI are relatively low, so that a different hysteresis mechanism is
operating. A recession may force high educated youth to downgrade and accept lower quality
jobs paying lower wages. Those who refuse to downgrade become temporarily unemployed. The
possibility of catching-up with a more fortunate generation that did not graduate in a recession is
hampered by a slower pace of human capital accumulation in these lower quality jobs (Gibbons
and Waldman, 2006), by rigidities induced by long-term contracting (Beaudry and DiNardo,
1991; Baker et al., 1994), or by search frictions that increase with age or job tenure, inducing
workers to stop searching for a better paying job (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). The very strict EPL
for white collar workers in Belgium increases the gradient of search frictions with age or job
tenure. Hence, we find much more persistence in hourly wages and earnings of the high skilled
in Belgium than in the more flexible North American labor markets.
Our study does not only provide insights in how distinct sources of rigidity drive different
hysteresis mechanisms. It also contributes to the literature in other dimensions. First, we
identify the long-run effects of recessions on labor market outcomes by exploiting the variation
of the provincial unemployment rate between five provinces and eight graduation years (1994-
2001 for the low educated and 1997-2004 for the high educated). This variation identifies the
causal impact of recessions only to the extent that the provincial unemployment rate does not
affect the composition of graduates in a province, either by changing the timing of graduation
or by inducing inter-provincial mobility. We show that the latter is negligible and propose a
new method for testing the former. The test is based on a discrete duration model relating the
timing of graduation since the end of compulsory education to the provincial unemployment
rate. We cannot reject the absence of such relationship.
Second, we have access to unusually rich data. Survey data are matched to comprehensive
administrative data from the various institutions of the Belgian Social Insurance system. The
survey data provides precise information on the timing of graduation, while the administrative
data contain, up to twelve years after labor market entry, detailed information (hours worked,
hourly wage and earnings) on salaried public and private sector employment, and also on time
spent as self-employed worker. For salaried workers we have also information on the quality of
the firm (as measured by the median wage). Existing research is often less comprehensive by
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focusing on particular labor market outcomes,2 either wages or (salaried) employment, or by
considering particular sub-populations (e.g. college graduates).
Third, we propose a new method of inference. Inference is complicated, since the regressor
of interest, the provincial unemployment rate at graduation, is a serially correlated variable that
is measured at a grouped level. Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that in such circumstances
the standard error can be severely downwards biased and that this bias can be very severe if
the number of groups (clusters) is small. To address this problem, we propose a novel feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) method closely related to the efficient Minimum Distance (or
Minimum Chi-square) estimator of Wooldridge (2006, 2010) for cross-section data and the FGLS
recently introduced by Brewer et al. (2013) for difference-in-differences designs.
We organize our discussion as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature on
the scarring effects of graduating in downturns. Section 3 summarizes the institutional setting.
In Section 4 we describe the data. In Section 5 the estimation strategy is explained, including the
way in which we deal with the problem of inference in the presence of a small number of clusters.
We report the results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. We refer the reader to a Supplementary
Online Appendix (http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/Ascars.pdf) for a detailed description of
the variables construction, the sample selection, the complete estimation results, as well as a
description and the results of the tests for the endogeneity of the timing of graduation and of
the inter-provincial mobility.
2 Literature Review
Researchers studying the long-term effects of graduating during recessions in North-America
report different findings for high than for low skilled youth. Graduating from college during a
recession imposes a modest but long-lasting penalty on earnings that gradually fades away in
about ten years (for Canada, see Oreopoulos et al., 2012, and for the US, see Mansour (2009),
Kahn (2010), Genda et al., 2010, and, very recently, Altonji et al. (2014)).3 These earnings losses
are essentially due to a decline in hourly wages, not in employment or hours worked. During
a recession college graduates are forced to accept lower quality jobs paying lower wages and/or
offering less career perspectives and less opportunities for promotion and training, since high
quality career jobs are then in reduced supply. Workers can react to this set-back and catch-
up with the more lucky generations that graduated during booms by enhancing investments in
human capital (Mroz and Savage, 2006), or by intensifying their search for higher paying jobs
2Genda et al. (2010) and, very recently, Altonji et al. (2014) are notable exceptions.
3Mansour (2009) and Kahn (2010) found more persistent effects, while Altonji et al. (2014) findings are more in
line with those of Oreopoulos et al., 2012 and Genda et al., 2010. In addition, these researchers provide evidence
that the penalty differs by field of study, with high-paying majors being less affected by initial conditions than
lower-paying ones, although less so during the Great Recession, when early impacts on earnings are reported to
have much larger impacts than during past recessions.
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(Topel and Ward, 1992). However, the possibility of catching-up is hampered by hysteresis in
career progression, both within and between firms. This can be due to imperfections in downward
wage renegotiations of lucky generations that entered in a boom (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991),4
or to information imperfections (Baker et al., 1994), both shielding the internal labor market
from the competitive forces in the external labor market. But also in the absence of long-term
wage contracts, part of the acquired human capital in these lower quality jobs is task specific,
leaving part of a worker’s human capital unutilized when she gets promoted, and, hence, inducing
lower wages many years later (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004, 2006). Moreover, search frictions
that increase with age or job tenure can induce workers to stop searching for a better paying
job (Oreopoulos et al., 2008, 2012).
For low skilled workers, by contrast, the effect of adverse labor market conditions at gradu-
ation has immediate important negative effects on wages and earnings, which fade away quickly
after a couple of years, and a small and only marginally significant, though persistent, effect
on employment. The number of hours worked is not affected (Genda et al., 2010). In a recent
work, Speer (2014) documents also reports severe, but short-lived effects of leaving high school
in a recession on wages (during the first four years) and on hours worked on the intensive and
the extensive margin (lasting only two years).5 This is because the labor market for low skilled
workers involves less investments in human capital and long-term career contracts. It operates
more like a spot market, in which wages rather than employment react rapidly to changes in
the economic environment (see e.g. Kilponen and Santavirta (2010) and Devereux and Hart
(2007)).
These findings are specific, however, since, in contrast with many other countries, the US
and Canada have very flexible labor markets. In a rigid labor market more persistent effects of
a recession are expected. Employers then have more incentives to screen job applicants before
hiring, because they are more forced into long-term relationships with their employees. If in an
upturn screening is less costly among the pool of recent graduates than among a pool of job-
seekers, unemployed because they graduated in a recession, then the latter group is more likely
to be set back permanently. Genda et al. (2010) find supporting evidence of this hypothesis.
In Japan the screening of recent graduates is indeed facilitated, both, because high schools
are obliged by law to help firms in matching graduated students to jobs, and because social
norm and resulting case law make dismissal of regular workers for economic reasons almost
prohibitive. In contrast to their results for the US, these authors find strong and persistent
4Recently Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) criticize this interpretation. They argue that wages are still deter-
mined by spot markets and not by long-term implicit contracts. They show that, once the current match quality
is taken into account, past labor market conditions no longer play a role in the wage determination.
5Kondo (2007) reports similar findings for other disadvantaged groups, such as black men and women. Her-
shbein (2012) pooling high school with college graduates reports findings lying in between of those found for low
and high educated youth separately.
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(lasting more than 12 years) negative effects of a recession on both employment and earnings for
low educated graduates in Japan. For the high educated, similar to the findings in the US, no
significant effect on employment is found, while the effect on earnings also declines, but starts
at a lower level and remains significantly negative after 12 years, rather than gradually fading
away, as in the US. Recently, Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) find in a cross-country study more
supporting evidence that recessions at labor market entry have more persistent adverse effects
on the (un)employment rate6 in countries with more labor market rigidity as measured by EPL
strictness, union coverage, and benefit duration of UI.7
Evidence from European studies only partially support the conclusions of aforementioned
studies. Within countries with moderate to high labor market rigidity, such as Norway, Sweden,
Austria, and Germany, persistent effects roughly in line with aforementioned theory are found.
Raaum and Røed (2006) find that in Norway a business cycle slump at ages 16 and 19 raises
prime age unemployment rates by as much as one to two percentage points. These authors
do not study the effect on wages. More recently, Liu et al. (2012) report similar persistent
negative effects on employment for college graduates. The effect of graduating in a period
of high unemployment on earnings is only significantly negative during the first three years,
but could be underestimated as a consequence of the positive selection induced by the effect
on employment (Heckman, 1974). Kwon et al. (2010) study the effect of labor market entry
conditions on wages of white collar workers in Sweden. If these workers enter the labor market
in a boom they obtain faster promotions which leads to persistent wage premiums for such
cohorts. Brunner and Kuhn (2014) report that in Austria a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate decreases the daily wage by 0.9% and persists at least 20 years, but this is
again a lower bound of the effect, since the employment rate is also persistently affected by the
business cycle. Similar to high educated workers in the US, effects for white collar workers are
smaller, and fade after five to ten years. However, in contrast to the US, and possibly related to
labor market rigidity, blue collar workers suffer more importantly and more persistently from a
recession. Stevens (2008) studying the effect for a population of low to medium skilled workers
in Germany finds more persistent effects on employment and wages of a recession than for
low educated workers in the US, but less persistent than in Austria and Japan for lower skilled
workers. She reports a negative effect on employment during the first five years after graduation,
which, as in the preceding study, leads to an underestimation of the effect on the wage in that
period. The latter is important in the first four years after graduation, but fades away after
seven years.
Two studies seem to contradict the theory that predicts more persistent effects in countries
with strict labor market regulations. First, despite the high labor market rigidity in France,
6In contrast to our contribution, Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) do not consider effects on other labor market
outcomes, such as on wages or earnings.
7Belgium was the most rigid country according to their composite index.
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Gaini et al. (2012) report in this country lower employment rates for cohorts graduating in a
recession only during the first two years and no wage penalty. The authors advance two potential
explanations: (1) a high minimum wage dampens the effect on wages and (2) a persistently high
unemployment rate, such that employers use unemployment less as a negative signal in the
hiring process (Biewen and Steffes, 2010; Kroft et al., 2013).
Second, according to Taylor (2013) leaving full-time education of any level in a recession
in Britain, a country with relatively limited labor market protection, very negatively affects
the probability of employment and the level of wages of young men, and this effect, even if it
declines, remains very negative even after ten years of potential experience. The authors do not
discuss why the effects are more important and persistent in Britain than in North-America, but
part of the explanation could be related to having a more vocational based educational system
in the Britain and a more a more general one in North-America. Hanushek et al. (2011) argue
that, although vocational based education is beneficial for low educated at the start of the career
by easing the transition into the labor market, their skills can very quickly become obsolete.
Consequently, in case of a recession at graduation, the low educated may have more difficulties
in integrating into the labor market once the economy recovers. By contrast, general education
provides broad knowledge and basic skills that makes graduates more adaptable to changes in
labor demand and, hence, less vulnerable to persistent damage in case of a temporary slowdown
of economic activity. Nevertheless, this distinguishing feature of the educational system cannot
explain why recessions in Britain lead to equally or even more persistent adverse labor market
outcomes than in other European countries, since most other European countries share this more
vocationally based educational system or have even developed it more, such as in Germany or
Austria.
3 Institutional Setting
Belgium is a federal state which has decentralized territorial competences to three Regions
(Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and person-related issues to three language Communities
(Flemish/Dutch, French and German). Education is organized by the Communities, Unemploy-
ment Insurance (UI) and employment legislation by the federal authorities, and Active Labor
Market Policies (ALMP) by the Regional employment offices. We briefly summarize the relevant
institutional environment of the Flemish Region and Community for the period of analysis.
Since the beginning of the eighties education is compulsory up to age 18. At that age pupils
have been six years in primary and six years in secondary school (high school). If they do not
repeat a grade, they complete secondary education at that age, except for those in a vocational
track for whom secondary education ends after seven years. Secondary school is segmented
in implicitly hierarchical tracks: (i) general, (ii) technical, (iii) vocational, and a smaller arts
track. In addition, from age 15, pupils may choose a part-time vocational or apprenticeship
7
track. Downward reorientation and grade repetition is used more often as remediation policy
than in other countries (OECD, 2012). The general and technical track directly (without a
central entry exam) prepares for enrollment in higher education. Those in the vocational track
must first complete a seventh specialization year. Our data refer to the pre-Bologna-reform
period. At that time, three kinds of higher degrees could be obtained: (i) non-university of the
short type (lasting three years), (ii) non-university of the long type, and (iii) university of the
long-type (usually four or five years). According to the PISA studies assessing in a standardized
way reading, mathematics and science skills at age 15 in large group of OECD countries, the
Flemish pupils steadily performed at the very top of European countries. However, at the same
time the spread of these scores is much higher than the OECD average, and the educational
performance is highly segmented according to social background. School drop-out in secondary
school is as high as 10% (Cockx (2013a); http://www.pisa.ugent.be/en/en).
UI in Belgium is very generous, not so much in terms of level, but of length of the entitlement.
It is one of the only countries in the OECD in which no time limit is set to the entitlement and
in which school graduates are entitled to (flat rate) unemployment benefits (UB) if they are still
unemployed nine months after registration. Job search requirements are very loose according
to international standards, and non-participation to active labor market programs (ALMP) is
hardly sanctioned (OECD, 2007; Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2012). Nevertheless, for youth UI may
not be so large a disincentive for full-time work, since in Belgium the national minimum wage is
among the highest in OECD (Cockx, 2013b). Moreover, in many sectors this national minimum
is topped up, by 17% on average (Rycx and Kampelmann, 2013). Even if the minimum wage
is found to have ambiguous effects on employment, at such high a level it is expected to reduce
employment of low skilled youth, for whom it is most likely binding (Kramarz and Philippon,
2001; Neumark and Wascher, 2008; Cahuc and Carcillo, 2014).
Among the OECD countries, Belgium has close to the most stringent restrictions overall on
individual and collective dismissals according to the OECD‘s EPL indicators (OECD, 2013).
This is especially a consequence of very restrictive rules for collective dismissals. For individual
dismissals in regular contracts EPL is less strict than the OECD average, but this conceals
considerable heterogeneity in strictness according to the type of labor contract. In Belgium
EPL for open-ended contracts differs between blue- and white-collar workers. For the latter
group, it differs between those earning more than e32,254 a year and those earning less. The
notice period for a blue-collar worker is generally less than one month for each five years of
seniority, while for low-wage and high-wage white-collar workers it is three and five months
respectively (Cockx, 2013b).
Even if EPL for blue collar workers is weak, a system of short-time work compensation (STC)
specific for this group restrains firm mobility of blue collar workers. This STC compensates blue
collar workers for temporary disruptions in business activity. These disruptions may last from
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maximum four weeks, in case of a complete temporary lay-off, up to maximum twelve months,
in case of a work suspension of at most one week for every two weeks. Firms must justify the
reason of the disruption to be able to invoke STC for their employees, but employer contributions
financing the scheme are not experience rated. The replacement rate may reach nearly 100%
(including employer top-ups), and no job search requirements or training are imposed on STC
recipients, so that the scheme restrains mobility more strongly than in other countries. STC
is extensively used in economic downturns and partly explains why the unemployment rate in
Belgium only modestly increased during the Great Recession in 2008 (Hijzen and Venn, 2011;
Høj, 2013).
Finally, in a nutshell, in Belgium most of the wages are usually determined according to wage
scales by function or level of education, and for white collar workers also by seniority or age.
Wages are automatically adjusted to the evolution of the consumer price index, and every two
years the trade unions and employers’ organizations bargain at the sectoral level on the extent
of real wage increase. Wages are therefore downward rigid (Fuss, 2009).
We mentioned in the Introduction that Belgium has one of the most rigid labor markets
in OECD in that inflow rates into unemployment are among the lowest, while expected unem-
ployment duration is among the highest. The description in this section suggests that this is
very much a consequence of institutions. Nevertheless, the sources of this rigidity are very dif-
ferent for blue collar workers, than for white collar workers. This suggests that the mechanism
underlying the long-run impact of adverse labor market conditions at graduation may be very
different according to these two types of workers. Ideally, we would like to conduct a separate
analysis for white and blue collar workers, but the choice between these worker categories is
clearly endogenously related to the business cycle.8 Hence, we exploit two facts to rationalize a
separate analysis for “low educated” (high school graduates or less) and “high educated” (above
high school). First, the correspondence between low (high) education and being employed as
a blue (white) collar worker is very high. 69% of the low educated are prevalently (i.e. more
than 50% of the time) employed as blue collar workers, while for the high educated this figure is
only 11% (see Table S.9 in the Supplementary Online Appendix). Second, we provide evidence
that the level of completed education is not endogenously related to the unemployment rate (see
Section S.5 of the Supplementary Online Appendix).
4 Data
For this analysis it is important to be able to accurately determine the timing of graduation,
since measurement error in this timing may lead to important compositional biases. For instance,
8The finding of Brunner and Kuhn (2014) that blue collar workers entering the labor force in an economic
downturn are persistently locked in, low-paying jobs and/or tasks may potentially partly be a consequence of
lower skilled workers being disproportionately hired as blue collar workers during adverse conditions.
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some studies assimilate graduation to the first registration as salaried worker according to admin-
istrative data. Such definition disregards those who transit from school to non-employment and,
hence, disregards a group the size of which clearly varies with labor market conditions. This in-
duces spurious correlation between labor market conditions at graduation and subsequent labor
market outcomes.
To avoid this problem, we base our analysis on the Sonar surveys conducted on a repre-
sentative sample of three birth cohorts, born in 1976, 1978 or 1980, and living in Flanders at
age 23, and which contains information on the time at which school is left.9 The surveys (as
well as follow-up surveys at age 26 or 29) register retrospectively and on monthly basis the
most important activity of the respondents, among which education. Based on this information,
graduation is identified to occur in the first month that education has been interrupted for more
than 4 months. This definition prevents considering summer breaks as exits from education.10
Individuals who re-enroll in education after the first exit (which corresponds to our definition
of graduation) are included in the analysis and, hence, non-employed during this period. Re-
enrollment is, however, rare in Belgium. Only 3.6% of the final sample re-enroll at some point
after the first graduation. We retain in the sample individuals leaving education between age
18, i.e. the compulsory schooling age in Belgium,11 and age 24. Graduates after age 24 are
not considered, because the small number of individuals involved would complicate inference
dramatically (see Section 5.2). The surveys also contain control variables for the analysis, which
are measured at age 17, such that they are predetermined at graduation: father’s and mother’s
education (years of completed education since age 12), the type of educational program (gen-
eral, technical, vocational or a part-time vocational and apprenticeship program) in which the
individual is enrolled at age 17, and the number of grade repetitions at age 17. The level of
education is measured by the number of completed years of education: grade repetitions are not
counted. This variable is used as a control in a sensitivity analysis.
The original Sonar sample contains about 3,000 individuals for each birth cohort, 9,000
in total. We only retain men to avoid dealing with sample selectivity induced by labor force
withdrawal of women for reasons related to fertility and caring responsibilities. Apart from the
aforementioned selection criteria regarding school-leaving age, we drop the following individuals
to enhance sample homogeneity: those who attended special needs and arts education, who did
not speak Dutch at home, or who did not permanently reside in Flanders at graduation. After
eliminating, in addition, individuals with missing or inconsistent values in variables, this leaves
us with a final sample of 3,514 men. A more detailed description of the variable construction
and the sample selection can be found in Sections S.1 and S.2 of the Supplementary Online
9For more details, see SONAR (2004a, 2003, 2004b).
10In high school the summer break typically takes place in July and August, while in some colleges the break
may already start in June and in universities it may stop only by the end of September.
11We drop 0.17% of individuals for which graduation is reported to occur before 18.
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Appendix.
Our empirical analysis also hinges on having access to high quality information on labor
market outcomes on a sufficiently long time span after graduation. We therefore matched the
survey data to administrative data of Belgian Social Insurance institutions centralized at the
Cross Roads Bank of Social Security. These data contain detailed quarterly information about
labor market histories between 1998 and 2010.12 For salaried workers we construct the following
outcomes: log annual earnings, log annual hours and log average hourly wage. The hourly wage
is obtained by dividing annual earnings by the total number of hours worked in a year.13 We
complement this information with three annual indicators of employment: self-employment (if
registered as such part of the year, irrespectively of being a salaried worker in the same year),
salaried employment (strictly positive earnings and not being self-employed), overall employment
(either self- or salaried). Notice, by these very broad definitions of employment, the business
cycle variation is more reflected in hours worked than in the employment rate. To get a sense
of whether the variation in hours worked reflects fluctuations in the time spent unemployed or
hours worked part-time,14 we also distinguish between hours worked full-time and part-time.
The administrative data provide additional control variables measured at age 17 (living in
single parent household, not living together with either parents, the number of other household
members by age class) and variables that help getting a better understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the long-term negative impacts on individual outcomes of adverse labor market
conditions at graduation (the median daily wage paid out on June 30 in recruiting firms and
indicators of firm and provincial mobility15). To obtain a measure of permanent firm quality,
we average the log median wage within recruiting firms over the observation period in a similar
way as Oreopoulos et al. (2012) (see Section S.1.3 of the Online Appendix for details).
Final sources of information are the Labor Force Surveys (LFS). These provide long time
series of the provincial and national16 unemployment rates, used to characterize recessions in the
labor market. Figure 1a plots both the youth (age 15-24) and overall unemployment rate (age
12Notice that part of the early labor market experience of cohorts graduating between 1994 and 1997 is missing.
13Taking log-transformations of these outcomes for salaried workers potentially leads to a sample selectivity
problem, since for workers who are not in salaried employment this transformation is not defined and, hence,
need to be dropped (Heckman, 1974). However, we will argue below that this selectivity is not a big concern in
light of the evidence that graduating in downturns does not significantly affect the probability of being in salaried
employment. Only for the high educated in the first few years after graduation there might be an issue, but this
is discussed.
14The administrative data do not measure overtime for full-time workers, so this cannot be a source of variation
in annual hours.
15An individual is defined to change firm in year t if he is observed in a different firm in at least two quarters of
the year t, or if the first firm in which he was employed in year t differs from the last firm in year t−1. Transitions
between self-employment and salaried employment are included in the definition of firm mobility. An individual
is defined to move in year t, if he lives in another province at the end of year t than where he lived at the end of
year t− 1.
16National refers to “Flanders” and not to “Belgium”.
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Figure 1: National and Provincial Unemployment Rates in Flanders.
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(a) National Unemployment Rates (UR):
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(b) Provincial Unemployment Rates (UR):
overall (age 15-64).
15-64) from 1993 to 2012. Observe, even if the level and the variability of youth unemployment
is much higher than the overall rate, the time pattern of both series is very similar. The period
of graduation 1994-2004 covered by our data captures a complete cycle, so that the main effects
of interest can be identified on national data. However, in line with the literature, we aim at
exploiting provincial specific time-shocks in the analysis. As Flanders is a relatively small region,
one may question whether commuting and changing residence would not make it impossible to
exploit the latter variation. That is, workers could offset the negative impact of graduating
in provinces with few job opportunities by moving or commuting to provinces with a tighter
labor market. However, the magnitude of the inter-provincial variation in the unemployment
rate reported in Figure 1b demonstrates that mobility far from eliminates all inter-provincial
variation.17
In Table A.1 in the Appendix A we report some descriptive statistics of the control variables
in the retained sample. As mentioned at the end of previous section, we distinguish between
men with a degree not higher than high school, i.e.“low educated”, and those with a higher level
of education, i.e. “high educated” as proxies for blue and white collar workers.
5 Estimation Strategy
To identify the long-term effects of labor market conditions at entry on the mentioned labor
market outcomes, we exploit, separately for low and high educated youth, the variation in the
unemployment rate at graduation both at the national and at the provincial level over 8 years
(1994-2001 for the low educated and 1997-2004 for the high educated). We operationalize this
17Notice that unemployment is measured in the province of residence and not of job location. Hence if workers
commute to avoid the negative local labor market conditions, this evens out the provincial variation in the
unemployment rate.
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identification strategy by estimating, as in the existing literature (Section 2), a linear regression
model of each outcome of interest on the unemployment rate at graduation and on a number of
potentially confounding factors.
This identification strategy requires that the composition of the graduating cohort to be
unrelated to this unemployment rate. We show that the unemployment rate at labor market
entry is not significantly related to (i) the timing of graduation, and (ii) the province of living. As
mentioned in the Introduction, we test the former by demonstrating that the duration between
the end of compulsory education at the age of 18 and each year of potential graduation is
unrelated to the provincial unemployment rate in those years.18 In a nutshell, we estimate a
proportional discrete hazard model (Kiefer, 1988; Jenkins, 1995) that regresses a yearly indicator
of graduation since age 17 on observed individual characteristics and the province of living
measured at age 17, the elapsed duration (in years) in education since age 17, and the provincial
unemployment rate in each potential year of graduation (i.e. an interaction term with the elapsed
duration). We also accommodate for the potential sorting bias induced by unobserved (Gamma
or Normal) heterogeneity. Since a joint test cannot reject that all aforementioned interaction
terms are significantly different from zero (with p-values ranging from 0.42 to 0.95), we can
safely conclude that the timing of graduation is exogenous to the business cycle. A detailed
presentation and discussion of these tests can be found in Section S.5 of the Supplementary
Online Appendix.
Since the provincial (national) unemployment rate is a serially correlated grouped regres-
sor, it is well-known that standard inference is misleading in that it tends to over-reject null
hypotheses (Bertrand et al., 2004). If, as in our case, the number of clusters is small (40 in the
provincial model and 8 in the national model),19 it is very difficult to obtain correctly sized tests
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Cameron et al., 2008). In Section 5.2 we propose a new inference
procedure that builds on the work of Brewer et al. (2013) and Wooldridge (2006, 2010), but that
is modified to take the specificities of our data into account.
18In contrast, e.g. Kahn (2010) finds evidence that the timing of graduation is affected by the labour market
conditions in her sample. Thanks to her, it is now standard to tackle this issue by instrumenting for the timing
and the location of graduation with age and location of birth (or at some other young age). However, this
approach does not work with our data, because contrary to the U.S., in Belgium grade repetition is widely
used as remediation (see Section 3), so that age is not a good predictor of graduation, causing thereby a weak
instrument problem.
19In the provincial model the number of clusters is equal to the 8 graduation years times the 5 provinces. The
reader might argue that this number of clusters is not small. However, in line with expectations if it is, we find for
continuous outcomes (not the discrete ones) that the standard cluster robust inference overestimates the precision
of the estimators (see Section 6.3).
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5.1 The Benchmark Linear Regression Model
The most general benchmark provincial regression model, which is separately estimated for low
and for high educated men, is specified as follows:
yigpt = fg(e)ugp+fgu(e)ugp1[ugp < u(g−1)p]+θe+φt+ft(e)upt+ηp+ωpt+f0(g)+x′iδ+εigpt (1)
where
• yitgp is the labor market income of interest in calendar year t for individual i who graduated
in year g while living in province p at the start of graduation year g;20
• ugp is the unemployment rate in province p and graduation year g. fg(e) is a linear spline
in potential experience, so that the interaction with ugp represents the effects of interest,
the long-run effects from graduating in downturns;
• 1[.] denotes the indicator function which is one if the expression between brackets holds
and zero otherwise, so that 1[ugp < u(g−1)p] is equal to one in case of an upturn in the
graduation year. fgu(e) is again a linear spline in potential experience. This second term
estimates the long-run effects from graduating in upturns;
• θe is a fixed effect for potential experience (e ≡ t−g), f0(g) is a linear spline in graduation
year and φt is a calendar year fixed effect;
21
• upt is the unemployment rate in calendar year t in the province p in which the individual
resides at the start of the graduation year g. This controls for provincial specific shocks
in the unemployment rate not captured by φt and potentially correlated with ugp. It
is interacted with ft(e), a linear spline in potential experience, which allows the current
unemployment rate to have different effects over time;
• ηp is a fixed effect for the province of residence at graduation;
• ωp is the provincial specific coefficient of a linear time trend. We include these provincial
specific time trends, because the unemployment rates exhibit differential downward time
trends (see Figure 1b);
• xi are individual control variables measured at age 17 reported in Table A.1;
20To avoid cumbersome notation, we ignore the subscript in pg.
21Even after dropping the fixed effect of the reference category, calendar time effects cannot be separately
identified from the effect of potential experience and graduation year, because of the accounting identity e ≡ t−g.
Since the calendar time effect is not our main interest, we follow Oreopoulos et al. (2012) and ensure identification
by just dropping a second calendar time fixed effect rather than imposing that the cohort effects sum to zero, as
in Deaton (1997).
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• igpt are the remaining errors, which include random unobserved province-graduation co-
hort effects and measurement errors that may be serially correlated (see Section 5.2).
The linear splines are expressed as follows:
fm(τm) = αm +
Jτm∑
j=0
βmj .(τm − 3j)1[τm ≥ 3j] for m ∈ {g, gu, t, 0} (2)
where, except for m = g, αm ≡ 0, τm = e if m ∈ {g, gu, t}, and τ0 = g. βm0 is the slope of
the linear function in potential experience (if m ∈ {g, gu, t}) or graduation year (if m = 0), and
βmj is the magnitude by which this slope changes every three years (i.e. if τm ≥ 3j). The slope
may change at most Jτm times. Je = 3, but for the high educated sample we set βm3 = 0 for
m ∈ {g, gu, t}, since at most 10 years of potential experience are considered instead of 12 years
for the low educated.22 Jg = 2, since only 8 graduation years are considered.
fg(e) is the function of interest, since it describes for each year e since graduation the
effect of a percentage point increase of the unemployment rate at graduation on the outcome
of interest. We allow for an asymmetric effect in an upturn which, similarly, is measured by a
percentage point decrease of the unemployment rate at graduation.23 The effect of a percentage
point decrease of ugp is −(fg(e) + fgu(e)). ft(e) allows for a differential effect of the current
provincial unemployment rate from the common calendar year effect φt. f0(g) controls for
common graduation year effects.
For all outcomes we always start by estimating the most general specification as specified in
(1).24 However, to enhance precision, we check each time whether we can impose the following
restrictions: all splines for the upturn and the current unemployment rate upt jointly equal to
zero; all θe and φt replaced by a linear spline as defined in (2); all ωp jointly equal to zero. In
Section 6 we only report the results of the estimations in which restrictions are imposed that
could not jointly be rejected at the 5% level. We report in the tables which restrictions are
imposed.
Finally, in a sensitivity analysis we also estimate a model in which we exploit the time
variation of the national unemployment rate. In this national model the subscripts p disappear
and also ft(e)upt, ηp and ωpt, since these terms are then no longer identified.
22We restrict the number of graduation and experience years in the analysis to avoid too small cell sizes, as
this is problematic for inference (See Section 5.2). Beyond 10 (12) years of experience not all birth cohorts of the
high (low) educated are observed any longer.
23This specification has been proposed by Genda et al. (2010).
24Eq.(1) is our preferred specification as it controls for a large set of confounding factors discussed in the
literature. Our findings are, however, robust to a more parsimonious specification in which we do not allow
for asymmetric effects during upturns (fgu(e) = 0) and for contemporaneous economic conditions to vary with
experience (ft(e) = 0). The results of this sensitivity analysis can be found in Section S.10 of the Supplementary
Online Appendix.
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5.2 Inference with a Small Number of Clusters
If there are a small number of clusters, Cameron et al. (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015)
propose using the wild bootstrap to obtain correctly sized tests and confidence intervals. The
method is, however, not so trivial to implement and, as acknowledged by the authors, compu-
tationally intensive for forming confidence intervals.25 Moreover, the method does not exploit
the possibility of enhancing the power of the statistical tests. Brewer et al. (2013) recently
proposed a straightforward method for inference that addresses these limitations in a difference-
in-differences (DiD) design. They demonstrate in Monte Carlo analysis that correctly sized tests
can be obtained by using bias corrected clustered standard errors in an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of the covariate-adjusted group-time means of the dependent variable on the
covariates varying at the group-time level. The bias correction is simple to implement, because
STATA correctly scales the standard errors by default. To enhance the power of this approach,
the authors exploit the serial correlation in the grouped errors using the feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) estimator proposed by Hansen (2007)26 that explicitly allows for a com-
mon autocorrelation pattern (e.g. AR(2)) across groups. To allow for misspecification of this
autocorrelation process the aforementioned cluster robust inference is applied to this FGLS es-
timator. This delivers, as the wild bootstrap, correctly sized tests and, if the number of time
periods is sufficiently large (from about 10 time periods), yields substantial power gains.
Since our model can be seen as a generalized DiD setting, in which we have variables that vary
at the group level (gp), i.e. each combination of graduation year (g) and province (p) is a cluster,
at the time level (t = g + e), and at the group-time level (gpt), this approach can be applied to
our analysis. However, in contrast to Brewer et al. (2013), group-time cells in our sample contain
a relatively small number of observations, so that we cannot ignore measurement error in the
covariate-adjusted group-time means of the dependent variables. To generalize their approach,
we build on the work of Wooldridge (2006, 2010). Wooldridge proposes a FGLS estimator in
case of cross-sectional data with only measurement error and no unobserved group effects. We
adjust this method for panel data and show how, as in Brewer et al. (2013), autocorrelated
unobserved group effects can be integrated in this approach.
In a first step, run a regression of yigpt on xi and group-time dummies using the micro-data
on the individual level:
yigpt = µgpt + x
′
iδ + igpt (3)
25We aim at identifying the effect of increasing the unemployment rate at graduation by one percentage point
for each of the up to 12 years after graduation. This requires forming confidence intervals of the values of the
linear spline defined in Equation (2) for each year after graduation. These values involve linear combinations
of the parameter estimates. Apart from further intensifying the computational burden, it is not obvious how to
proceed in this case.
26Brewer et al. (2013) show that Hansen’s bias-corrected FGLS delivers only little more power than the ordinary
FGLS.
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where µgpt are the group-time fixed effects, i.e. the covariate-adjusted group-time means, and
igpt is the error term of this micro regression. In a second step, the estimated group-time fixed
effects µˆgpt are regressed on the group-time level covariates:
µˆgpt = fg(e)ugp + fgu(e)ugp1[ugp < u(g−1)p] + θe + φt + ft(e)upt + ηp + ωpt+ f0(g) + vgpt (4)
where vgpt = egpt + (µˆgpt − µgpt), egpt is the unobserved group-time shock measured at calendar
time t and (µˆgpt − µgpt) is the measurement error in the covariate-adjusted group-time means.
Brewer et al. (2013) assume the latter to be zero. Consequently, even if cluster robust standard
errors still result in correct inference, taking the (co-)variances of the measurement errors into
account could enhance efficiency.
In the case of cross-sectional data, Wooldridge (2006, 2010) proposes implementing the effi-
cient Minimum Distance (MD) estimator, also called the ‘Minimum Chi-Square’ estimator, of
the covariate-adjusted group means on the group level explanatory variables. This consists in
estimating (a cross-sectional) version of (4) by FGLS. If egpt = 0, the optimal weight in the
FGLS is the inverse of the variance matrix of (µˆgpt− µgpt) estimated in the first step. Since the
efficiency of this procedure depends on whether unobserved group-time shocks egpt are indeed
zero, it is useful to notice that this can be tested for. If the observed group level explana-
tory variables cannot fully explain the variation in µˆgpt, the regression model (4) is likely to
be rejected against the saturated model, i.e. the weighted sum of squared residuals (WSSR),
distributed χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of groups minus the number of
estimated parameters, is larger than the conventional rejection level.
Generalizing Wooldridge (2006, 2010)’s approach to panel data requires accounting for the
serial correlation in the error term igpt of the first step regression. We do this by taking the
individual i as clustering unit in the first step and use the conventional cluster-robust variance
matrix of the µˆgpt estimated in the first step as weighting matrix in the second step.
27 The
χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic allows testing for the presence of unobserved group-time shocks, i.e.
egpt 6= 0. In case of no rejection, the conventional standard errors can be used for inference. In
case of rejection,28 the (bias-corrected) cluster robust standard errors allow for serial correlation
in egpt.
In case of rejection, we attempt to increase power by explicitly allowing for the variance in
egpt in addition to that of the measurement error, and for a particular serial correlation pattern
in egpt, as in Brewer et al. (2013). To this purpose, we follow Amemiya and Nold (1975) by
assuming that the measurement errors (µˆgpt−µgpt) and the unobserved group-time shocks (egpt)
are uncorrelated, and that the variance of egpt is homoskedastic across groups and time, so that
we can estimate the latter by subtracting an estimate of the average variance of the measurement
27Since the individual is taken as clustering unit, the number of clusters is sufficiently large to implement
conventional inference procedures.
28We use the conventional 5% as threshold for the size of the test.
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error (v̂ar(µˆgpt) ≡ sˆ2gpt) from an estimate of the average variance of the composite error term
vgpt:
v̂ar(egpt) ≡ σˆ2e =
1
GPT
G∑
g=1
P∑
p=1
T∑
t=1
(
vˆ2gpt − sˆ2gpt
)
(5)
where vˆgpt denotes the residual of an OLS regression of (4), G the number of graduation years,
P the number of provinces, and T the number of calendar years retained in the grouped re-
gression.29 Subsequently, this estimated variance can be added to the diagonal of the variance
matrix of the measurement error to obtain an estimate of the (heteroskedastic) variance matrix
of vgpt: v̂ar(vgpt) = σˆ
2
e+sˆ
2
gpt. The inverse of this variance is then used to estimate the parameters
in (4) by FGLS.30 Depending on whether the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model or
not, respectively conventional or cluster robust standard errors should be calculated after this
modified FGLS.
In this empirical application we find for most outcomes that σˆ2e < 0,
31 even if the aforemen-
tioned χ2 rejects the model and, hence, suggests that unobserved group-time shocks are present.
This suggests that the imposed homoskedasticity assumption is not satisfied, and that it is thus
difficult to enhance power by explicitly taking the unobserved group-time shocks, in addition
to the measurement error, into account. The cluster robust standard errors calculated after the
FGLS that just takes measurement error into account still provides correct inference, however.
These are therefore the ones that we report in most of our estimations when the goodness-of-fit
statistic rejects the model.
Finally, we explain how we deal with a number of practical issues encountered with the
proposed inference methods. First, the benchmark outcomes must satisfy adding-up constraints:
(i) the indicator of salaried employment and the one of self-employment sum to the indicator
of overall employment; (ii) log hourly wages and log annual hours worked sum to log annual
earnings; (iii) the sum of the annual number of hours worked full-time and part-time is equal
to the total annual hours worked. These adding-up constraints are automatically satisfied if the
first and second step regression models, (3) and (4), are estimated by OLS. However, this is no
longer true if FGLS is applied in the second step on each outcome separately, since then the
weighting matrices ignore the correlation that these constraints impose on these outcomes. To
overcome this problem, we jointly estimate both the first and the second step in a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR), as proposed by Zellner (1962). Since the adding-up constraint makes
the variance matrix of the three outcomes singular and hence non-invertible, we leave out one
of the three outcomes and calculate the parameters and standard errors of the third model from
29In the data the number of calender years varies by group, i.e. by gp combination. Therefore T should be
indexed by gp, but to avoid cumbersome notation we do not do this.
30Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) show how an AR(1) process on egpt can be modeled.
31We only find σˆ2e > 0 for salaried employment rate in the national model, both the low and high educated
group (see Section S.9 of the Supplementary Online Appendix).
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the constraint.32 An estimate of the variance matrix, the inverse of which is used as weight in
the second step FGLS SUR, is obtained from the conventional cluster robust estimate of the
variance matrix of the covariate adjusted means µˆgpt calculated after a pooled OLS on the first
step SUR. By clustering at the individual level in the first step, the variance matrix accounts
not only for unrestricted serial correlation in the outcomes, but also for unrestricted correlation
across outcomes.
Second, in our data we find cases in which the employment status of all individuals belonging
to a cluster gp does not vary over some calendar years t. This induces perfect serial correlation
in the covariate-adjusted group-time means µgpt and, hence, the cluster robust variance matrix
of these µˆgpt is singular. We therefore use in these cases the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse
of the variance matrix as weight in the second step FGLS. To avoid numerical imprecision, we
manually set as many eigenvalues to zero as the number of times that the employment rate
for particular groups is repeated over time. This accordingly reduces the number of degrees of
freedom in the second step.
Finally, asymptotic inference for the Minimum Chi-Square estimator is only valid if groups
are sufficiently large. In the statistical literature some rules of thumb are suggested for what is
large enough for the Central Limit Theorem to apply. For continuous outcome variables (such as
log hours, log wages or log earnings) a group size (Ngpt) of 30 observations is typically considered
sufficient, while for dichotomous outcomes (such as the employment rate) the minimum of the
expected number of successes and failures should be sufficiently large. A commonly accepted
rule for the latter is that min{NgptPgpt, Ngpt(1−Pgpt)} ≥ 5, where Pgpt denotes the probability of
success and which can be estimated by aggregating the individual predictions of this probability
in the first step OLS regression of (3) to the cluster-time level gpt. According to Cochran (1954)
the approximation is, however, still acceptable if for less than 20% of the groups this expectation
is smaller than 5 while remaining larger than 1.
For the national model these rules are satisfied if we restrict the analysis to graduation years
1994-2001 for the low educated and to 1997-2004 for the high educated. For the provincial model
we must drop additional groups. For the continuous outcomes, applying the aforementioned
rule reduces the sample size too much, so that we retain groups-time cells containing between
16 and 30 observations, which still delivers a reasonable approximation if the distribution of the
underlying random variable does not differ too much from the Normal. For the dichotomous
outcomes, we calculate for each group-time cell and outcome the aforementioned expectations,
take the minimum of these expectations over the outcomes retained in the same SUR, and drop
group-time cells with the smallest minimum until the aforementioned Cochran’s rule is satisfied.
Dropping these cells introduces, however, a concern of selectivity. We therefore test for this.
32Barten (1969) has shown that the parameter estimates are invariant to the equation deleted. However, Berndt
and Savin (1975) have demonstrated that in case a model with autoregressive disturbances is modeled invariance
requires restrictions on the parameters of the autoregressive process.
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We construct for each outcome an indicator that is equal to one if the individual belongs to
a group-time cell that is dropped according to the aforementioned rules and zero otherwise.
Subsequently, we use these indicators as dependent variable in a one-step regression on model
(1) in which we impose the same restrictions as the ones used for the corresponding outcome, and
in which we cluster the standard errors by group gp. Finally, we test the null hypothesis that all
the coefficients of the linear spline (fg(e)) that interacts the unemployment at graduation (ugp)
are jointly significantly different from zero. Since the number of clusters is small, we tend to
over-reject the null-hypothesis. But the null hypothesis is never rejected in any of the considered
outcomes, so that we can therefore be confident that selectivity is not an issue.
In Table A.2 in Appendix A we report for the benchmark continuous and dichotomous
outcomes the number of cells that are dropped and retained, as well as the mean and maximum
size of these cells. We also provide the aforementioned statistics for cells that are retained, but
that do not satisfy the aforementioned stricter rules, i.e. for cell sizes between 16 and 30 if the
outcome is continuous, and for cells for which the minimum of the aforementioned expectation
is smaller than 5 in case of a dichotomous outcome. Finally, we also include the P-value of the
joint test of selectivity mentioned in the previous paragraph.
6 Results
We now discuss our findings for the low educated and high educated sub-samples. We will report
for each outcome the effect of a percentage point (pp) increase in the unemployment rate by the
potential number of years of experience in the labor market since graduation. This corresponds
to what is commonly reported in studies, but notice that it is difficult to use these effects to
make cross-country comparisons. This is because a pp rise of the unemployment rate in a typical
recession depends on the degree of labor market flexibility, and also on whether the overall, or
youth unemployment rate is used in the analysis. In a rigid labor market the unemployment
rate varies less over the business cycle, than in a flexible one, and the youth unemployment rate
tends to vary more than the overall rate. The problem is that studies usually do not report
by how many pp’s the unemployment rate increases in a typical recession. An exception is the
study of Oreopoulos et al. (2012) for Canada, characterized by a flexible labor market. The
authors report that the unemployment rate rises by five pp’s in a typical recession. To compare,
in Flanders this figure was only 1.4 pp’s on average in the 1994-2010 period (and by 1.6 point
only in the Great Recession in 2008).33 Consequently, if we want to compare the effect of a
typical recession in Canada to such one in Flanders, we must multiply the effect of a pp increase
of the unemployment rate in Canada by a much larger factor than in Flanders. This can put
33A recession is defined to be a period during which the unemployment rate increases uninterruptedly. Hereafter,
we will refer to a “typical recession” as the average pp increase of the provincial unemployment rate during such
recessions in Flanders in the 1994-2010 period.
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the findings in a different perspective. For instance, despite the short-term effect of a one pp
increase of the unemployment rate on earnings is much smaller for high educated Canadian
graduates (-1.8%) than for Flemish (-5.8%), the effect for a typical recession is comparable or
even slightly larger in Canada (-9% versus -8.1%).
6.1 The Findings for the Low Educated
In Figure 2 we graphically report for the low educated sample the effect of increasing the provin-
cial unemployment rate at graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The reader
can find in Table B.1 in Appendix B the corresponding point estimates and standard errors, as
well some information about the estimated model, among which the P-value of the goodness-
of-fit statistic, whether cluster-robust or conventional standard errors are used (conventional
standard errors are used if the aforementioned P-value exceeds 5%), and which restrictions were
imposed on the benchmark specification (4). The complete estimation results (including the
first step (3) and the second step OLS) are only reported in Section S.6 of the Supplementary
Online Appendix. Notice that for all provincial models (4) was estimated in a SUR by FGLS
in which the estimated variance of the unobserved group effects was set to zero (v̂ar(egpt) = 0),
since in all cases it was estimated to be strictly negative in (5). It is actually only found to be
strictly positive for one outcome only in case that the variation of the national unemployment
rate was exploited (see Section S.9 of the Supplementary Online Appendix).
The top panel of Figure 2 reveals that a recession at graduation does not significantly (at
5%) affect employment, but confidence intervals are relatively wide, especially for salaried and
self-employment. The point estimate suggests that a one pp increase of the unemployment
rate at graduation increases the self-employment rate by 3.6 pp’s (significant at 10%), but this
effect rapidly drops to zero after three years. This provides weak support that a recession
pushes young low skilled graduates to self-employment by lack of salaried employment.34 It
also suggests that there might be some pressure from employers in economic downturns to take-
up pseudo self-employment, as avoid the minimum wage restrictions and to be able to pay
lower Social Insurance contributions that are due for self-employed workers (see e.g. European
Commission (2010)). In line with this evidence, the salaried employment rate decreases, but
to a lesser extent: according to the point estimates, -1.7 and -1.1 pp in the first and second
year of potential experience, but these estimates are not significant. Since the point estimate of
the effect on salaried employment is very close to zero beyond the first two years of potential
experience, we should only be concerned that the effect of the unemployment rate at graduation
on variables that are solely observed in case of salaried employment, such as wages, hours and
34There are two competing hypotheses on the role of the business cycle on self-employment. Aside the mentioned
push hypothesis, the pull hypothesis states that high unemployment negatively affects individual expectations
about the success of self-employment, or reinforce credit constraints. Empirical evidence on the relative importance
of these hypotheses is mixed. For recent evidence, see e.g. Fairlie (2013) and Yu et al. (2014).
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earnings, is biased as a consequence of selectivity (Heckman, 1974) in the first few years after
graduation, if at all.
In the middle panel of Figure 2 we observe that the average hourly wage is hardly affected by
adverse conditions at graduation. At the same time the annual number of hours worked drops
persistently during the 12 first years of potential experience, starting from a decrease of 4.4 pp
in the first year after graduation, increasing slightly to a value that ranges between -2.5 and -3
pp from year three to twelve. From the bottom panel we can deduce that nearly all the effect on
hours worked is induced by a reduction in hours worked full-time, and not by an increase in hours
worked part-time. Only in the first year after a recession, the number of hours worked part-time
increases significantly. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that the minimum wage
is binding for this low skilled youth and, hence, induces a higher incidence of unemployment.35
They are also in accordance with the literature, mentioned in the Introduction, that early career
unemployment permanently increases the likelihood of unemployment later in the career (e.g.
Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013)). However, they contrasts starkly with the sharp temporary
downward adjustment in wages, and marginal effects on employment and hours that Genda
et al. (2010) report for low educated youth in the flexible US labor market.
The effect on earnings nearly mirrors that on hours worked. This is because the effect on
wages is close to zero. We also find that the effect of an upturn at graduation on hours worked
is not symmetric to that of a downturn. In an upturn the number of hours increase more
importantly than they decrease in a downturn. Up to four years after an upturn, the hours
worked increase by 5 to 6 % for each pp decrease of the unemployment rate at graduation.
Thereafter the effect gradually fades to zero after ten years. This means that the costs of a
recession are lower than the benefits of a boom, but also that the costs are more persistent.
Even if the wage is hardly affected by the business cycle at graduation, we find that an
increase of one pp of the unemployment rate at graduation persistently decreases the median
wage in the recruiting firms by roughly 1.5% over all 12 years following labor market entry
and this effect is always significant, or close to (see Table B.2). This suggests that scars of a
recession are not only induced by a higher incidence of unemployment, but also by the lower
quality of the first job, which is not directly apparent, because of the downward rigidity imposed
by the minimum wage. This is in line with the observation in the middle panel of Figure 2 that
some years after labor market entry a recession at graduation does seem to have a growing
negative impact on the hourly wage. In the benchmark model this growing negative impact is
not statistically significant. However, when in the sensitivity analysis we consider the second
step OLS instead of FGLS estimates this impact steadily decreases and becomes significantly
negative at the 5% level beyond seven years of experience (see Table S.21 of the Supplementary
Online Appendix). This is compatible with the hypothesis that lower quality jobs entered during
35This is not incompatible with a zero effect on the employment rate, because the latter is only affected if the
unemployment spell is not interrupted by any employment throughout a complete calendar year.
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Figure 2: The Effect of a One Percentage Point (pp) Increase in the Provincial Unemployment Rate at
Graduation: Low Educated
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The figure displays for the low educated the effect of increasing (decreasing in case of an upturn) the provincial un-
employment rate at graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The effects reported in top, middle and
bottom panel result each time from two-step FGLS estimates of a SUR model on the first two outcomes described in
detail in Section 5.2. The effects for the third outcome are obtained from the following adding up constraints: salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT
hours worked=total hours worked. Table B.1 in Appendix B reports the corresponding point estimates displayed in the
figure.
23
a recession have a less steep wage profile with seniority than the higher quality jobs accessed
during a tight labor market.
Since EPL is much stricter for white collar than for blue collar workers (see Section 3) and
the high educated are predominantly employed as white collars and the low educated as blue
collars (see Section 4), firm mobility is expected to be higher for the low than for the high
educated. This is only to a minor extent reflected in the fraction that remains employed in the
same firm. Five (ten) years after graduation this fraction is 26% (15%) for the low educated
and 31% (17%) for the high educated.36 This may be a consequence of the system of STC,
which allows firms to retain blue collar workers over the business cycle (see Section 3). By
contrast, 24% (18%) of the low educated changes jobs in more than two (four) out of the first
(ten) years of potential experience against 12% (7%) of the high educated. This suggests that
a lower EPL strictness does not so much enable more upward mobility, but that it rather leads
to a more pronounced segmentation of the labor market in, on the one hand, a segment with
relatively stable employment and, on the other hand, a segment in which workers cycle from one
short tenured job to another. But this relationship is not necessarily causal, since this type of
segmentation can be a characteristic of the labor market for low skilled workers. In any case, the
less strict EPL does not allow the unfortunate low educated, entering the labor market during
a recession, to catch up with the more fortunate group. The unemployment rate at graduation
is unrelated to firm mobility (see Table B.2).37
Finally, geographic mobility is negligible. During the observation period each year on average
only 1.5% of the low educated changes residence to another province. It is therefore not surprising
to find that the unemployment rate at graduation is unrelated to geographic mobility (see Table
B.2).
6.2 The Findings for the High Educated
The findings for the high educated can be found in Figure 3 and Table C.1. In the top panel of
Figure 3 we see that the overall employment rate of the unfortunate cohorts is during the first five
years after graduation slightly, but significantly lower than that of the more fortunate cohorts.
The point estimates gradually rise from -1.5 pp to zero in these years. After five years the effects
remains very closely to zero. In view of the wide confidence intervals, it is difficult to assign this
negative impact to a decrease in salaried or self-employment. According to the point estimates,
the drop in the first year is completely explained by the lower salaried employment rate, while
in the subsequent years it seems that the lower self-employment rate is more the driving force.
In any case, the impact on the employment rate is relatively small, which is to be expected,
because higher educated are more in demand, irrespectively of the business cycle. Hence, also
36For more detailed statistics, see the Supplementary Online Appendix Table S.12.
37The unemployment rate at graduation is also unrelated to sector mobility. Results are available upon request.
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the aforementioned selectivity issue for the labor market outcomes in salaried employment is
likely to be negligible, or matters at most during the first two years after graduation. In contrast
to our findings for the low educated, a recession does have a significant negative impact on the
hourly wage. In the first two years it is slightly lower than in the following ones, but this could
be a consequence of the aforementioned selectivity problem. Those who are unemployed in
the first years after a recession are likely to be less productive and earning lower wages than
the group that is employed in these years. This may bias the negative effect on wages slightly
upwards. From the third year this bias should no longer play a role. We observe that the
wage penalty rises steadily (and significantly) from then onwards, starting at -3.2% after three
years and attaining -4.4% after ten years. The initial wage penalty suggests that high educated
graduates are forced to accept lower quality jobs for which they are possibly overeducated (see
Baert et al. (2013) for evidence on this using the same survey data) and which pay lower wages.
As a consequence of the high labor market rigidity, in particular the strict EPL (see Section 3),
job mobility is limited (see more evidence of this below). Hence, these unlucky generations are
trapped in these lower quality jobs and definitely miss the opportunity to be hired in career jobs
with a steeper seniority pay profile. In line with this hypothesis, the aforementioned study of
Baert et al. (2013) demonstrates that young unemployed graduates who accept a job for which
they are overeducated remain trapped in these jobs for many years. This explains why the wage
penalty rises over time rather than gradually fades, as in more flexible labor markets (Genda
et al., 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
The annual number of hours worked is 3.5% lower for each pp rise in the unemployment rate
at graduation, but rapidly rises to zero after three years, level at which it remains subsequently.
From the bottom panel of Figure 3 we can deduce that this is nearly entirely38 due to a reduc-
tion in full-time hours. This suggests that those who refuse to downgrade become temporarily
unemployed. But in contrast to lower educated workers, this does not permanently increase
the likelihood of unemployment later in the career, but rather raises the likelihood of remaining
employed in lower quality jobs.
The combined effect on wages and hours yields the effect on earnings. At the start of Section
6, we have already made a comparison of this effect with that of the more flexible labor market
in Canada. Notice also, that the effect on hours worked is, as for the low educated, asymmetric
for up- and downturn. In an upturn the annual number of hours worked increases slightly more
and slightly longer.
In the previous section we already described firm mobility, and explained that the strict
EPL for white collar workers lowers it for the high relative to low educated. Nevertheless, in
contrast to the low skilled, we do find some evidence (see Table C.2 in Appendix C) that the
high skilled who graduate during a downturn are more likely to move from one job to another
38We also observe a small, but permanent increase in the number of hours worked part-time.
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Figure 3: Effect of one pp Increase in the Provincial URate at Graduation: High Educated
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The figure displays for the high educated the effect of increasing (decreasing in case of an upturn) the provincial un-
employment rate at graduation by one pp on the main outcomes of interest. The effects reported in top, middle and
bottom panel result each time from two-step FGLS estimates of a SUR model on the first two outcomes described in
detail in Section 5.2. The effects for the third outcome are obtained from the following adding up constraints: salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT
hours worked=total hours worked. Table C.1 in Appendix C reports the corresponding point estimates displayed in the
figure.
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in the following year. This may mitigate the initial wage penalty. However, in contrast to what
is observed in more flexible labor markets (see e.g. Oreopoulos et al., 2012), in all subsequent
years the unlucky graduates are not more (nor less) mobile than the lucky ones.39 In line with
this and the aforementioned evidence, the median wage in the recruiting firm is during the first
ten years of labor market experience persistently smaller (on average 3.3%) for each pp increase
of the unemployment rate at graduation. Hence, the unfortunate workers remain trapped in
lower quality jobs.
Finally, on average 3.2% of the high educated move to another province each year. This is
more than double as much as for the low educated. Nevertheless, we cannot find any evidence
that geographic mobility is significantly related to the unemployment rate at graduation (see
Table C.2).
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In Supplementary Online Appendix S.8 we report a number of sensitivity analyses for the six
main outcomes that we considered in the analysis: the three indicators of employment, log
hourly wage, log annual hours worked and log annual earnings. In a first sensitivity analysis we
include dummy variables for each number of completed years of education as individual control
variables in the first step regression. If the timing of education is unrelated to the unemployment
rate, the inclusion of these variables should not affect the conclusions. This is what we find.
Second, we contrast the provincial to the national model. In the national model identification
relies on the calender time variation of the unemployment rate at labor market entry in deviation
from the parametrically specified (linear spline) dependence of graduation time. Because of this
strong identifying assumption, we do not find a complete correspondence between the models,
but overall the patterns of the effects are quite comparable, certainly if we account for the
higher degree of imprecision in the national model. In particular, we find a larger negative effect
on hours worked (and, hence in earnings) in the first year after graduation, and for the high
educated also in years nine and ten. In addition, the effect on the self-employment rate of the
high educated displays a strong positive trend from experience years six to ten, which we did
not observe in the provincial model.
Third, for the dichotomous indicators we always estimated a linear probability model in
the first step. As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate a probit model in the first step, and,
subsequently, the covariate-adjusted group-time means on the aggregate regressors by FGLS. In
Tables S.20 and S.22 of the Supplementary Online Appendix we report the partial effects on
the probability of employment for each year of potential experience, where the other aggregate
39Sector mobility is never affected by the unemployment rate at graduation. Hence, in the first year of potential
experience the high educated significantly move between firms within the same sector. Results are available upon
request.
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regressors are evaluated at their sample mean. These partial effects are very similar to the
ones that we found in the benchmark linear probability model. The main difference is that the
estimates of probit model are much less precise.
The benchmark model was estimated by FGLS on the second step regression model (4).
This should generally deliver more precise estimates than those obtained by OLS with cluster
robust standard errors in this second step. For the continuous outcomes, FGLS results indeed
generally in more precise estimates than OLS. Exceptions are the effects on the log hourly wage
for the low educated (and only to slight extent for the high educated).40 However, this can be
a consequence of the log hourly wage being estimated jointly with log annual hours worked in a
SUR regression. The larger standard errors in the wage equation are more than compensated by
the higher precision of the effects in the hours equation. For the dichotomous variables, FGLS
delivers in this particular application somewhat less precise estimates of the effects of interest.
Only for the effect on the overall employment rate of the high educated the standard errors
obtained by FGLS are consistently smaller.
Finally, we compare OLS applied to the one-step regression model (1) to OLS applied in the
second step. In both cases we cluster standard errors by province and year of graduation combi-
nation (gp). Point estimates are very comparable, but because of the small number of clusters,
we expect the standard errors of effects in the one-step OLS regression to be downward biased.
This is what we find for the continuous outcomes. However, for the dichotomous outcomes this
is only the case for the effect on the overall employment rate of the low educated. This suggests
that for this particular application the downward bias is important for the continuous outcomes,
but not for the dichotomous ones.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the short- and long-run impacts of graduating in a recession in Flanders,
the largest region in Belgium that is characterized by a very rigid labor market. We analyzed
these impacts separately for high and low educated workers, because labor market institutions
are different for white and blue collar workers, for which the aforementioned education types are
very good proxies. While EPL is very strict for white collars and relatively weak for blue collars,
the minimum wage is binding for the latter group and not for the former. Consequently, while a
recession at graduation is found to have a persistent negative effect on earnings for both groups,
the high educated experience a persistent negative effect on the hourly wage and not on the
annual hours worked, and the reverse holds for the low educated. These results are corroborated
by a comprehensive set of sensitivity analyses. Concretely, a typical recession, which increases
the unemployment rate by 1.4 pp, would induce the annual hours worked (and, hence, earnings)
40Notice, as mentioned in Section 6.1, the effect of a pp increase of the unemployment rate at graduation is
now found to be significantly negative as from seven years after labor market entry for low educated.
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of the low educated to decrease by about 4.5% up to twelve years after graduation, while the
hourly wage (and, hence, earnings) of the high educated would be roughly 6% lower than in case
of a status quo ten years after labor market entry. The Great Recession of 2008 resulted in an
increase of the unemployment rate of 1.6 pp, so that we predict that the negative consequences
for the cohorts that graduated during the Great Recession will be about 15% (=˜ 0.2/1.4) higher
than the aforementioned ones.
Our results add to the evidence that labor market rigidity leads to much more persistent
negative effects of recessions at labor market entry (Genda et al., 2010; Kawaguchi and Murao,
2014) and to fundamentally unjust (since it is induced by just bad luck) inequality between
generations. At the same time our findings for low educated demonstrates that relaxing EPL
alone is not sufficient to avoid persistence. Broader structural policy reforms seem to be required,
which are much more difficult to implement.
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APPENDIX
A Descriptive Statistics.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Controls in the Retained Sample.
Low Educated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label§
live in single-parent 1885 0.119 0.324 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
not live with parents 1885 0.064 0.244 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11† 1885 0.247 0.625 0 7 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1885 0.507 0.687 0 7 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1885 0.520 0.729 0 8 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1885 1.890 0.400 0 5 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1885 0.037 0.207 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education†† 1885 4.582 3.196 0 13 father completed education since age12
mother education†† 1885 4.199 3.066 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu‡ 1885 0.825 0.843 -1 4 years of delay at age17(Aug)
general edu§§ 1885 0.108 0.310 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical edu 1885 0.379 0.485 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational edu 1885 0.412 0.492 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc edu 1885 0.101 0.302 0 1 1 if apprent./PT vocational at age17(Aug)
birth cohort76‡‡ 1885 0.333 0.471 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1885 0.333 0.471 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1885 0.334 0.472 0 1 1 if born in 1980
High Educated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
live in single-parent 1629 0.079 0.270 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
not live with parents 1629 0.027 0.162 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0-11 1629 0.154 0.424 0 3 nr of other HH members aged0-11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12-17 1629 0.578 0.687 0 4 nr of other HH members aged12-17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18-29 1629 0.583 0.717 0 4 nr of other HH members aged18-29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30-64 1629 1.926 0.299 1 4 nr of other HH members aged30-64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1629 0.029 0.185 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
father education 1629 7.031 3.239 0 13 father completed education since age12
mother education 1629 6.382 2.935 0 13 mother completed education since age12
years of delay in sec.edu 1629 0.260 0.540 -1 3 years of delay at age17(Aug)
general edu 1629 0.652 0.477 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
technical edu 1629 0.339 0.473 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
vocational edu 1629 0.009 0.092 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
apprenticeship/PT voc edu 1629 0.001 0.025 0 1 1 if apprent./PT vocational at age17(Aug)
birth cohort76 1629 0.330 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1976
birth cohort78 1629 0.341 0.474 0 1 1 if born in 1978
birth cohort80 1629 0.330 0.470 0 1 1 if born in 1980
§“at age17(Dec)” (“at age17(Aug)”) means that the variable is measured in December (August) of the year when the
individual turns age 17.
†HH refers to household.
††It measures the number of years of education successfully attained since age 12.
‡The variable measures the educational progression at age 17: a value of 0 means that the student is on time; -1 means
that the student has skipped one academic year; positive values indicate the number of repeated grades.
§§In the first step of the main analysis general education is the reference category.
‡‡In the first step of the main analysis birth cohort76 is the reference category.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics Regarding the Selection Rules for the Benchmark Outcomes in the
Provincial Model∗
Low educated High educated
Graduation period: 1994-2001 1997-2004
Outcomes§ Continuous Discrete Continuous Discrete
Number of cells (total) 420 420 350 350
Number of dropped cells 42 138 27 109
Number of retained cells 378 282 323 241
Statistics on dropped cells
Mean size dropped cells 10.29 30.97 13.11 27.95
Max size dropped cells 15 111 15 66
Statistics on retained cells
Mean size retained cells 45.19 57.56 37.64 47.48
Max size retained cells 104 111 79 89
Statistics on retained cells for which 16 ≤ Ngpt < 30 (continuous) or EXP †gpt < 5 (discrete)‡
Number of retained cells 94 38 123 46
Avg size retained cells 23.06 45.08 23.08 34.07
Max size retained cells 29 111 29 66
P-value joint test for selectivity§§
Specification used for log hourly wage 0.322 0.637
Specification used for log hours worked 0.091 0.105
Specification used for all discrete outcomes 0.379 0.207
∗ To avoid too small cell sizes, we impose the following selection rules. For continuous variables, drop cells gpt with size
Ngpt < 16. For discrete variables, drop cells gpt with the smallest EXP
†
gpt until at most 20% of the retained cells are such
that EXPgpt < 5 (Cochran, 1954).
†EXPgpt = min{NgptPgpt, Ngpt(1− Pgpt)}, where Pgpt denotes the probability of success and which can be estimated by
aggregating the individual predictions of this probability in the first step OLS regression of Eq. (3) to the cell level gpt.
Notice that the aforementioned minimum is calculated for each outcome in the SUR and that the selection rule is applied
on the basis of the smallest minimum across these outcomes.
§The benchmark continuous outcomes in the SUR are log hourly wage and log hours worked in salaried employment, and
the benchmark discrete variables are salaried employment and self-employment. The statistics in the table refer to one
outcome, since they are identical for each outcome retained in a SUR.
‡These are groups that would have been dropped according to the more stringent selection rules, i.e. Ngpt < 30 for the
continuous outcomes and EXPgpt < 5 for the discrete outcomes.
§§The test for selectivity is based on a one-step regression of an indicator that is set to one if the individual belongs to a
cell that is dropped according to the selection rules mentioned in (∗). Standard errors are clustered by group gp, which
therefore tends to over-reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the linear spline that interacts the unemployment
rate at graduation are jointly significantly different from zero. We impose the same restrictions on the regression model
(1) as we do for each benchmark outcome that we retain in the SUR (see Table B.1). Consequently, since different sets of
restrictions are imposed on the regression of log hourly wage than on that of log hours worked, we report two P-values for
the continuous outcomes. For the discrete outcomes the same restrictions are imposed on both outcomes, so that only one
P-value is reported.
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B Results for the Main Outcomes of Interest of Low Educated.
Table B.1: Effect of a One pp Increase of the Unemployment Rate at Graduation on Main Outcomes: Low Educated
Outcomes salaried self-empl. overall empl. log wage log hours§ log earnings FT hours PT hours Total hours
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symm. up/downturn yes yes - yes no - yes yes -
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes - no no - no no -
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes - no no - no no -
Effect of prov-time trends=0 yes yes - no no - no no -
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.286 - 0.155 - 0.268 -
P-value of chi2 test 0.341 0.000 - 0.000 -
WSSR (2nd step) 331 - 1289 - 1519 -
Obs (2nd step)† 375 - 756 - 754 -
Parameters (2nd step) 54 - 88 - 86 -
Level of clustering no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 -0.017 0.036 0.018 0.005 -0.044 -0.039 -123.741 36.280 -87.462
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026) (33.386) (12.419) (26.467)
2 -0.011 0.021 0.010 -0.001 -0.035 -0.036 -82.608 15.700 -66.908
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.023) (28.233) (9.828) (23.051)
3 -0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.026 -0.033 -41.474 -4.879 -46.354
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (24.951) (9.819) (22.119)
4 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.026 -0.034 -30.805 -6.854 -37.659
(0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (22.293) (8.855) (19.123)
5 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.026 -0.035 -20.135 -8.829 -28.964
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (20.394) (8.282) (16.793)
6 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.025 -0.036 -9.466 -10.804 -20.270
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (19.475) (8.183) (15.434)
7 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.025 -0.033 -23.298 -2.250 -25.548
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (18.219) (7.363) (14.743)
8 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.025 -0.031 -37.129 6.304 -30.826
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (18.010) (7.409) (14.801)
9 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.025 -0.028 -50.961 14.858 -36.103
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (18.883) (8.307) (15.598)
10 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.027 -0.033 -44.904 15.268 -29.637
(0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (19.371) (7.981) (16.251)
11 0.004 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.030 -0.039 -38.848 15.678 -23.170
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (21.167) (8.434) (17.862)
12 0.006 -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 -0.033 -0.045 -32.791 16.088 -16.703
(0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (23.977) (9.556) (20.202)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at graduation by
one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear spline in potential experience
fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in Eq. (4). Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total
hours worked), the estimates are each time obtained from a two-step FGLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum described in detail in Section
5.2 and briefly below. Effects on the third outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. First step: Eq. (3) is estimated
by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Second step: Eq. (4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance
matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight. Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the
5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard
errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones.
§For log hours worked the following additional restriction (not mentioned in the table) is also imposed: βg2 = 0, i.e. the slope of the linear spline
remains fixed after 6 years of experience. This restriction cannot be rejected.
†The lower number of observations for the discrete outcomes in the second step reflects both that a different number of cells was dropped to ensure
large enough cell sizes and the fact that the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is singular so that we had to use the generalized inverse
of the variance as weight in the second step (see Section 5.2 for more details).
Column 5 and 6 report the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other columns
report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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Table B.2: Effect on Mobility and Firm Quality: Low educated
Outcomes geographical mobility§ firm mobility median daily wage in the firm
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn no yes yes
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE yes no no
Spline for exp FE yes no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes no
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.478 0.252 0.854
P-value of chi2 test - 0.001 0.001
WSSR (2nd step) - 413 422
Obs (2nd step) - 360 378
Parameters (2nd step) - 35 39
Test joint signif. URate grad (P-val) 0.126 0.720 -
Level of clustering i g ∗ p g ∗ p
Estimation approach one-step two-step two-step
Potential experience (1) (2) (3)
1 0.000 0.008 -0.014
(0.003) (0.019) (0.011)
2 -0.001 0.005 -0.016
(0.002) (0.012) (0.010)
3 -0.001 0.001 -0.018
(0.003) (0.013) (0.009)
4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016
(0.002) (0.010) (0.008)
5 0.000 -0.003 -0.015
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
6 0.000 -0.005 -0.014
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
7 0.002 0.001 -0.015
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
8 0.003 0.006 -0.015
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
9 0.004 0.012 -0.016
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
10 0.003 0.009 -0.017
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
11 0.002 0.006 -0.017
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008)
12 0.001 0.003 -0.018
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at graduation
by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear spline in potential
experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in Eq. (4). Since the outcomes need not satisfy adding-up
constraints, except for geographic mobility (see §) the estimates are obtained from a two-step FGLS on each outcome separately. The estimation
procedure is described in detail in Section 5.2 and briefly below. First step: Eq. (3) is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Second step: Eq. (4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight.
Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel
of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise
conventional ones.
§Notice that the effect on geographic mobility between provinces is estimated in one step, since virtually no cell satisfies the rule of Cochran (1954)
discussed in Section 5.2. In the one-step approach both clustering at the individual and the g ∗ p-level tends to over-reject. Since the P-value of
the joint test of significance of the unemployment rate at graduation is higher at the individual than at the g ∗ p level we report the former.
Column 1 reports the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other columns report
the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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C Results for the Main Outcomes of Interest of High Educated.
Table C.1: Effect of a One pp Increase of the Unemployment Rate at Graduation on Main Outcomes: High educated
Outcomes salaried self-empl. overall empl. log wage log hours log earnings FT hours PT hours Total hours
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symm. up/downturn yes yes - yes no no yes -
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes - yes yes no yes -
Spline for calendar year FE yes yes - no no no no -
Effect of prov-time trends=0 yes yes - no no no no -
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.494 - 0.309 - 0.390 -
P-value of chi2 test 0.329 - 2.89E-34 - 4.48E-32 -
WSSR (2nd step) 310 - 1084 - 1059 -
Obs (2nd step)† 262 - 646 - 646 -
Parameters (2nd step) 48 - 75 - 78 -
Level of clustering no no no g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
Potential experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 -0.016 0.001 -0.015 -0.023 -0.035 -0.058 -81.986 23.301 -58.685
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (22.004) (9.359) (18.501)
2 -0.006 -0.007 -0.013 -0.028 -0.014 -0.041 -31.209 15.540 -15.669
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (17.068) (6.611) (14.479)
3 0.003 -0.014 -0.011 -0.032 0.008 -0.025 19.569 7.778 27.347
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (15.191) (6.132) (12.584)
4 0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.033 0.004 -0.029 6.612 10.017 16.629
(0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (12.390) (5.697) (9.889)
5 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.033 0.001 -0.032 -6.345 12.256 5.911
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (11.468) (5.445) (9.492)
6 0.005 -0.006 0.000 -0.033 -0.003 -0.036 -19.302 14.495 -4.807
(0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (12.835) (5.403) (11.630)
7 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.036 -0.002 -0.038 -11.662 14.625 2.963
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (11.589) (5.111) (9.769)
8 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.039 -0.001 -0.040 -4.022 14.755 10.733
(0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (11.567) (4.964) (9.198)
9 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.042 0.001 -0.041 3.618 14.885 18.504
(0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (12.775) (4.975) (10.137)
10 -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.044 0.002 -0.043 11.258 15.016 26.274
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (14.919) (5.142) (12.244)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at graduation by
one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear spline in potential experience
fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in Eq. (4). Since the outcomes satisfy adding-up constraints (salaried
employment+self-employment=overall employment; log hourly wage+log hours worked=log earnings; FT hours worked+PT hours worked=total
hours worked), the estimates are each time obtained from a two-step FGLS SUR on the first two outcomes in the sum described in detail in Section
5.2 and briefly below. Effects on the third outcome (the sum) are then obtained from the adding-up constraints. First step: Eq. (3) is estimated
by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Second step: Eq. (4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance
matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight. Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the
5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard
errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise conventional ones.
†The lower number of observations for the discrete outcomes in the second step reflects both that a different number of cells was dropped to ensure
large enough cell sizes and the fact that the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is singular so that we had to use the generalized inverse
of the variance as weight in the second step (see Section 5.2 for more details).
Columns 5-7 and 9 report the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other columns
report the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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Table C.2: Effect on Mobility and Firm Quality: High educated
Outcomes geographical mobility§ firm mobility median daily wage in the firm
Imposed Restrictions:
Effect URate at grad. symmetric up/downturn yes yes no
Effect Current URate over exp=0 yes yes yes
Spline for calendar year FE no no no
Spline for exp FE yes no no
Effect prov-time trends=0 yes yes yes
Test joint signif. all imposed restr.(P-val) 0.273 0.471 0.236
P-value of chi2 test - 0.964 0.028
WSSR (2nd step) - 214 336
Obs (2nd step) - 285 323
Parameters (2nd step) - 32 35
Test joint signif. URate grad (P-val) 0.495 0.165 -
Level of clustering i no g ∗ p
Estimation approach one-step two-step two-step
potential exp (1) (2) (3)
1 0.009 0.026 -0.037
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
2 0.005 0.008 -0.038
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
3 0.001 -0.009 -0.039
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
4 0.001 -0.007 -0.035
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
5 0.001 -0.006 -0.031
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
6 0.001 -0.004 -0.027
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
7 0.002 -0.005 -0.029
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
8 0.003 -0.006 -0.031
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
9 0.005 -0.007 -0.033
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
10 0.006 -0.008 -0.035
(0.005) (0.015) (0.007)
Standard errors between parentheses. The table shows the effect for low educated of increasing the provincial unemployment rate at graduation
by one pp on the mentioned outcomes. The reported estimates result from predictions based on the estimates of the linear spline in potential
experience fg(e) that multiplies the provincial unemployment rate at graduation ugp in Eq. (4). Since the outcomes need not satisfy adding-up
constraints, except for geographic mobility (see §) the estimates are obtained from a two-step FGLS on each outcome separately. The estimation
procedure is described in detail in Section 5.2 and briefly below. First step: Eq. (3) is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Second step: Eq. (4) is estimated by FGLS, where the inverse of the variance matrix of the µˆgpt in the first step is used as weight.
Depending on the outcome, we impose restrictions which cannot be jointly rejected at the 5% level: these restrictions are listed in the top panel
of the table. If the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic rejects the model (P-value>0.05), standard errors clustered at the gp level are reported; otherwise
conventional ones.
§Notice that the effect on geographic mobility between provinces is estimated in one step, since virtually no cell satisfies the rule of Cochran (1954)
discussed in Section 5.2. In the one-step approach both clustering at the individual and the g ∗ p-level tends to over-reject. Since the P-value of
the joint test of significance of the unemployment rate at graduation is higher at the individual than at the g ∗ p level we report the former.
Column 3 reports the effects of interests in downturn: the effects in case of an upturn are different, but not reported. All other columns report
the effect of interest independently of the business cycle, since this restriction is not rejected.
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